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ABSTRACT

This research examines the impact of framing and base size of computer security
risk information on users’ risk perceptions and behavior (i.e., download intention and
download decision). It also examines individual differences (i.e., demographic factors,
computer security awareness, Internet structural assurance, self-efficacy, and general
risk-taking tendencies) associated with users’ computer security risk perceptions. This
research draws on Prospect Theory, which is a theory in behavioral economics that
addresses risky decision-making, to generate hypotheses related to users’ decisionmaking in the computer security context. A 2 × 3 mixed factorial experimental design (N
= 178) was conducted to assess the effect of framing and base size on users’ download
intentions and decisions. The results show that framing and base size of computer
security risk information are associated with users’ perceived risk and risk-taking
behavior. More specifically, negative framing and large base size increase users’
perceived risk and reduce users’ risk-taking behavior. Moreover, users who have greater
general risk-taking tendencies and perceive higher Internet structural assurance exhibited
lower risk perceptions and greater risk-taking behavior in the computer security context.
The findings from this research suggest that using negative framing and large base size to
communicate computer security risk information is an effective way to lower risk-taking
behavior of users.
Keywords: Framing, Computer Security, Risk, Decision-making
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1. INTRODUCTION

Computer security threats are common on the Internet. To reduce cybersecurity
risks and protect users’ private information, computer security scientists are working
toward providing security warnings, security indicators, pop-up windows, and other types
of warning systems when users are at risk of cybersecurity threats. Users play a
fundamental role in identification and prevention of computer threats (Stanton et al.,
2004). They are expected to assess cybersecurity threats before they conduct online
transactions, access a URL, or download files or applications. For example, users make
decisions related to downloading software from anonymous sources and providing
personal information to conduct online transactions. Their choices could bring negative
outcomes, such as data and information leakage and damage to their personal computer.
A report by IBM indicates that more than 95% of the security occurrences in IBM
were attributed to human errors (IBM Corporation, 2014). As the “weakest link” in the
security chain, people sometimes fail to detect threats. Users’ ability to identify security
risks is crucial in an online environment. Therefore, it is important to study users’
behavior in the computer security context.
Identification of security risks is dependent on users’ perceptions and behavior
toward potential threats. Some of the previous studies on cyber threats have focused on
comparing physical or structural cues and miscues (Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz, 2006;
Darwish & Bataineh, 2012; Smith et al., 2016). They also looked at Internet users’ ability
to interpret cues and miscues that are embedded in web pages or emails. Moreover,
researchers have studied human factors that are associated with users’ online behavior,
including individual differences, gender differences, human cognitive limitations, and
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other factors influencing how users distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent
messages (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs et al., 2006).
Aytes and Conolly’s (2004) decision model suggests that users’ online behavior is
driven by their assessment of the outcomes of risk-averse and risk-taking actions. Their
study shows the importance of cybersecurity knowledge and awareness, as well as the
impact of hazard attitudes on behavior. A crucial aspect of users’ behavior in
cybersecurity is how users assess and perceive the messages of computer threat warnings.
Thus, users’ risk perceptions play a crucial role in attaining computer security.
The goal of this research is to explore how computer security risk information can
be presented to reduce users’ risk-taking decision-making and behavior. A laboratory
experiment was conducted to examine the impact of framing of cyber security scenarios
and presentation of risk information of different base sizes on users’ risk perceptions and
behavior. Specifically, we are interested in studying whether negatively framed messages
give rise to risk-averse actions more than positively framed messages and whether
increasing the base size of the evidence of computer threats decreases users’ risk-taking
behavior.
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of related
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical foundation and hypotheses. Section 4
describes the research methodology, design, and procedure. Section 5 and Section 6
present and discuss the findings. The limitations and future research directions are
presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the thesis.

3
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Research on usable computer security has focused on understanding human factors
and improving systems to foster safer user behavior in the context of computer security.
This section provides a review of the literature on human factors in computer security,
especially in the context of users’ susceptibility to cyber-attacks.

2.1. COMPUTER SECURITY DECISION-MAKING
Understanding the human cognition and decision-making process is key to explain
users’ behavior when faced with cybersecurity threats. Hence, we need to open up the
‘black box’ in order to understand users’ cyber decisions, such as decisions to click through
a link embedded in an email, download files from websites, or enter personal information
on e-commerce websites or social media.
Several studies have focused on developing better interface and warning design to
get the attention of users in order to foster safer cybersecurity behavior. Researchers have
studied security warnings from multiple perspectives. In a laboratory study to assess the
effectiveness of phishing warnings, it was found that more than 90% of the participants
fell into the trap of phishing emails without any warnings (Egelman et al., 2008). On the
contrary, when active warnings were popped up on the screen, 79% of the participants
avoided the phishing attack. Based on these findings, it was recommended that warnings
or indicators be provided to convey recommended actions to users even though they may
interrupt the users’ work. In a large-scale field study that assessed the effectiveness of
browser security warnings on the Firefox and Chrome’s telemetry platform, it was found
that more participants entered personal information when there were no active warning
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indicators than when active warning indicators were provided (Akhawe & Felt, 2013).
The findings in another study indicate that opinionated framing or design increases
adherence by users through decreasing the rate of click-through of SSL warnings (Felt et
al., 2015).
Smith, Nah, and Cheng (2016) examined user assessment of security levels in ecommerce by varying cues/miscues (i.e., HTTP vs. HTTPS, fraudulent vs. authentic
URL, padlocks beside fields) presented on web pages. They conducted a within-subjects
experiment where users rated their perceived security, trustworthiness, and safety after
examining each of the e-commerce web pages that vary in these cues/miscues. They
found that padlocks provided beside a field (i.e., miscues) do not affect user perceptions
of security but primed subjects to look for more important security cues, such as HTTP
vs. HTTPS.

2.2. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO COMPUTER SECURITY THREATS
Human factors, such as past experience, culture, and concerns with Internet
security, are expected to influence user security behaviors. In a study that investigated the
relationship between demographic characteristics and phishing susceptibility, participants
were asked to complete a background survey before they proceeded to a roleplay on
phishing, where they were asked to click on a phishing link or enter personal information
on phishing websites (Sheng et al., 2010). The study discovered two predictors of
phishing susceptibility: gender and age. Specifically, the results indicated that women
were more likely than men to fall into the phishing trap. The authors provided a possible
reason for the gender difference by suggesting that women tend to have less technical
knowledge than men. Moreover, individuals of 18-25 years of age were more susceptible
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to phishing. This group appears to be more susceptible because participants in this age
group have lower levels of education, less experience on the Internet, and less of an
aversion to risks.
Flores, Holm, Nohlberg, and Ekstedt (2015) examined the influence of
demographic, cultural, and personal factors on phishing. Participants from nine
organizations in Sweden, USA, and India participated in their survey to compare users’
behavior in response to phishing attacks across users of different cultural backgrounds.
The results did not indicate any relationship between phishing and age or gender, but they
found that intention to resist social engineering, formal IS training, computer experience,
and computer security awareness have a significant effect on reactions to phishing.
Additionally, the results indicate that the correlation between phishing determinants and
employees’ actual phishing behavior differs between Swedish, US, and Indian
employees.
In a study by Goel, Williams, and Dincelli (2017), phishing emails were sent to
more than 7000 undergraduate students and their responses to the phishing emails were
recorded. The phishing message contained different rewards, such as a gift card, tuition
assist, and a bank card. The results show that susceptibility varies across users with
different demographics (i.e., major and gender). Females were more likely to open
phishing emails, with an overall rate of 29.9% compared to 24.4% among males, and the
rate varies based on the content in the emails. Participants with business education
background had the highest opening/clicking link rate compared to those with social
science, business and STEM background. Based on the results, the authors suggest
developing context-based education to decrease susceptibility to phishing attacks on the
Internet.

6
In another study that examined the effect of gender and personality on phishing,
females were found to be more vulnerable to phishing (Halevi et al., 2013). In their study,
53% of women were phished as compared to 14% of men. The authors attributed the
behavior to females being more comfortable with online shopping and digital
communication than males. Moreover, they found that people who fell into the phishing
trap have very high neuroticism. A possible explanation that neuroticism could result in
susceptibility to phishing attacks is that neuroticism may cause people to be more upset
when being deceived and therefore, people rather believe that things and people are
generally truthful.
Vishwanath (2015) studied the influence of e-mail habits and cognitive processing
on phishing susceptibility. Phishing emails were sent to college students to assess their
responses. The students were asked to complete a survey on their background and
demographic information. The results indicate that e-mail habits are determined by
individual personality traits of conscientiousness and emotional stability, and cognitive
processing was premised on information adequacy. Basically, there are two routes of
cognitive processing: heuristically and systematically (Chaiken & Eagly, 1989). Heuristic
processing uses judgmental rules that are learned and stored in memory, whereas
systematic processing includes comprehensive and analytic processing of judgementrelevant information. This study found that heuristic processing and strength of email
habits led to an increase in victimization.
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the influence of user characteristics on
susceptibility to computer security threats.
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Table 2.1. Summary of Research on Susceptibility to Computer Security Threats
Reference

Research Focus

Summary of Findings

Sheng et al.,
2010

Investigated the relationship
between demographic
characteristics and phishing
susceptibility

Females are more susceptible to phishing
email than males.18-25-year-old
individuals formed the most susceptible
age group.

Flores et al.,
2015

Examined the influence of
demographic, cultural, and
personal factors on phishing

The results did not find any relationship
between phishing and age or gender, but
they found that intention to resist social
engineering, formal IS training,
computer experience, and computer
security awareness have a significant
effect on reactions to phishing.

Goel et al.,
2017

Explored if susceptibility
varies across users with
different demographics (i.e.,
major and gender)

Females were more likely to open
phishing emails, with an overall rate of
29.9% comparing to 24.4% among
males, but the rate varies based on the
content in the emails. Participants with
business education background had the
highest opening/clicking link rate
compared to those with social science,
business and STEM background.

Halevi et al., Examined the effect of
2013
gender and personality on
phishing

Females were found to be more
vulnerable to phishing. Neuroticism is
correlated with susceptibility to
phishing.

Vishwanath, Studied the influence of e2015
mail habits and cognitive
processing on phishing
susceptibility

Heuristic processing and email habits led
to an increase in victimization.

2.3. FRAMING EFFECTS IN CYBERSECURITY DECISION-MAKING
Prospect theory suggests that decision-making under risk depends on whether the
potential outcome is perceived as a gain or a loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) proposed that choices between options can be affected by the
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framing of the options. Their findings indicate that people tend to avoid risks under gain
frames but seek risks under loss frames. Moreover, losses have a greater impact on
people’s decision-making than gains. In addition, when subjects were required to explain
their choices, the framing effect tended to be reduced (Larrick et al., 1992). The framing
effect could be eliminated if users are encouraged to think through the rationale
underlying their choices (Takemura, 1994). Also, if users are experts in a particular area,
the framing effect will also be reduced (Davis and Bobko, 1986).
Various researchers have utilized prospect theory to study users’ behavior in the
information science field. They evaluate the impact of positively vs. negatively framed
messages on users’ decision-making, including financial decisions (Brewer & Kramer,
1986), idealness of messages, perceived prominence (Aaker & Lee, 2001), and threat
awareness (Lee & Aaker, 2004).
However, the results of empirical studies on the effect of framing are not
consistent. An experiment conducted by Rosoff, Cui, and John (2013) examined the
effect of gain and loss framing on user decisions, including downloading a music file,
installing a plug-in for an online game, and downloading a media player to legally stream
video. The study investigated whether and how human decision-making depends on gainloss framing and the salience of a prior near-miss experience. They examined one kind of
near-miss experience, resilient near-miss, which refers to the case where a user had a
near-miss experience on a cyber-attack. They carried out a 2 x 2 factorial design and
manipulated two levels of each of the two independent variables: frame (gain vs. loss
framing) and previous near-miss experience (absence vs. presence). Their results indicate
that users tend to follow a safe practice when they have prior experience with a near-miss
cyber-attack. They also concluded that females are more likely to select a risky choice
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compared to males. Unexpectedly, the results suggest that subjects were indifferent
between safe versus risky decision options when the outcomes were framed as gains or
losses.
Cybersecurity researchers also expand the definition of “gain-loss” framing. In
Valecha et al.’s (2016) study, “gain” was operationalized using a reward-based phishing
email and “loss” was operationalized using a risk-based phishing email. Reward-based
persuasion is designed to attract users by offering a reward or benefit. For example,
emails that inform the recipient about winning a lottery. On the other hand, risk-based
persuasion is designed to scare people by highlighting a potential risk. The study found
that the presence of both reward-based persuasion (gain frame) and risk-based persuasion
(loss frame) increase response likelihood.
Chen, Gates, Li, and Proctor (2015) conducted three experiments to assess the
influence of negatively and positively framed summary of risk information on appinstallation decisions. Risk information was framed as the amount of risk (negative
framing) or amount of safety (positive framing) in the experimental conditions. The
results suggest that the summary that was positively framed (as the amount of safety) has
a greater effect on app-installation decisions than the negatively framed (as the amount of
risk) summary. Hence, a valid index that is framed positively by focusing on safety can
be developed to increase users’ app-installation decisions.
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the literature on the effects of framing on
decision-making.

10
Table 2.2. Summary of Research on Framing Effects on Decision-Making
Reference

Research Focus

Summary of Findings

Tversky &
Kahneman,
1981

Impact of monetary losses
and gains on users’
behavior

Users perceived losses more seriously
than gains.

Beebe et al.,
2014

Effect of framing of
messages on user’s
financial decision

Users tend to be more risk-taking when
presented with a case of financial losses
than gains.

Chen et al.,
2015

The influence of summary
risk information on appinstallation decisions

Positive framing (safety index) decreases
users’ risk-taking behavior

Rosoff et al.,
2013

The influence of gain-loss
framing on decisionmaking

Subjects were indifferent between safe
versus risky decision options when the
outcomes were framed as gains or losses.

Valecha et
al., 2016

The effect of reward-based
vs. risk-based phishing
email on response

Both reward-based and risk-based
phishing email in phishing increases
response likelihood.
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3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES

Section 3 review theories from behavioral science and psychology to provide the
foundation for this research.

3.1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
We draw on theories from behavioral science and psychology to provide the
foundation for this research. Specifically, we draw on the principles of decision making
under risks and uncertainty in Prospect Theory to analyze user perceptions associated
with computer security, and Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behavior,
and Technology Acceptance Model to generate hypotheses on user behavior in the
context of computer security.
3.1.1. Prospect Theory. People do not always make rational decisions because
they value gains and losses differently. Prospect theory is a descriptive theory that
focuses on this phenomenon and addresses how people make decisions when they are
facing choices involving risks and uncertainty (e.g., different likelihood of gains and
losses). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) proposed that people make choices based on the
phrasing or framing of the options. They also explored how different framing affects
choices in a hypothetical life and death situation in 1981, which is known as the “Asian
disease problem”. The subjects were told that “the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of
an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people” (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981, p. 453). They were provided with two options, one predicted to result in 400
deaths, whereas the other one predicted 33% chance that everyone would live and 67%
chance that everyone would die.
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Half of the subjects were given two positively framed options:
A. 200 people will be saved (a certain outcome)
B. 1/3 probability of saving 600 people and 2/3 probability of saving none
(an uncertain outcome)
The other half of the subjects were given two negatively framed options:
C. 400 people will die (a certain outcome)
D. 1/3 probability that none will die and 2/3 probability that 600 will die (an
uncertain outcome)
Expected Utility Theory (Mongin, 1997), which is an alternate theory to prospect
theory in decision-making, assumes that the choice people made is of the highest
satisfaction to the decision maker. From the perspective of Expected Utility Theory, the
two options (i.e., a certain one and an uncertain one) in positive framing are
mathematically equivalent to the two options in negative framing since they provide the
same utility (satisfaction). “200 people will be saved” implies that among 600 people,
there are 200 people will surely be saved, so one-third of the 600 people will not die.
While “400 people will die” in the negative frame implies that two-thirds of the 600
people will die. As a result, subjects are expected to choose the option in a similar way
regardless of the frame of the problem. In other words, based on Expected Utility Theory,
the percentage of risky choices is expected to be the same (or at least similar) in both
framing.
Surprisingly, in the positively framed scenario, 72% of the subjects selected the
certain option and 28% selected the risky option. On the contrary, in the negatively
framed scenario, only 22% of the subjects selected the certain outcome and 78% selected
the risky option. The results suggest that when provided with positive prospects, people
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are more willing to go for the certainty of saving 200 people and refuse the possibility
that no one will be saved. On the other hand, when provided with negative prospects,
people would rather pursue the option with uncertainty, due to the fear of a large loss of
400 people’s lives. In other words, people have the tendency to avoid losses and optimize
for sure wins since the pain of losing is greater than the satisfaction of an equivalent gain.
Thus, people are risk-averse in positive framing and risk seeking in negative framing.
This phenomenon that is termed “Framing Effect” describes a common cognitive bias in
decision-making.
Prospect theory uses two factors to explain the framing effect: the reference point,
and the value function. The reference point refers to the status quo, determining how the
outcomes are framed, either positively or negatively. When outcomes are greater than the
reference point, they will be considered as gains, while they will be considered as losses
when the outcomes are less than the reference point. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) used
a value function to explain and depict the difference in risk preferences among choices
involving gains and losses. The value function is a cubic parabola type curve, which is
nearly asymmetrical in gain and loss domains (see Figure 3.1). The gain side is concave
which suggests that people are risk-averse when people make choices involving gains,
whereas the loss side of the curve is convex, indicating that people tend to be risk-seeking
when they make choices involving losses. Moreover, the value function is steeper for
losses than gains, representing individuals weighing losses more heavily than gains.
In the “Asian disease” problem, the reference points in each framing are different.
The positive framing refers to saving lives, so the status quo is “zero people saved”, thus
both options suggest a potential gain. In the opposite, the negatively framed problem
refers to death. The reference point, in this case, is “zero people died” so the two options
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can be viewed as losses. Drawing on the value function, the result of the Asian Disease
problem can be explained as follows: the risky option is preferred in negative framing
because people are risk-seeking in order to avoid larger losses; the option with certainty
is preferred in positive framing because people are risk-averse and more willing to go
with sure gains.

Figure 3.1. Value Function

3.1.2. Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory of Planned Behavior. Theory of
Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) provide a theoretical
foundation for modelling users’ behavior in the computer security context.
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TRA is a psychology theory that links people’s attitude and behavior (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1967). It examines the relationship among attitude, subjective norm, behavioral
intention, and behavior. This theory states that individual’s behavior is based on their preexisting attitudes and behavioral intentions. Basically, one’s decision to engage in a
particular behavior is based on motivation to perform the behavior, which can be
considered as the individual’s expectation of the outcome of performing a particular
action. To be more specific, people’s behavioral intention to perform a behavior is the
main predictor of their actual behavior. Behavioral intention is the intention to perform
the behavior, which precedes the actual behavior and is determined by attitudes and
subjective norms.
TPB focuses on explaining the relationships between attitude, subjective norm,
perceptional behavioral control, behavioral intention, and behavior (Ajzen, 1991). It
proposes that one’s behavioral intention is shaped by attitude toward behavior, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioral control, while behavioral intention is the key predictor
of behavior. As an extension of TRA, TPA includes behavioral control as an additional
determinant of intention and behavior. In sum, to predict whether an individual intends to
perform a behavior, we need to know whether the person is in favor of performing the
action (i.e., attitude), how much social pressure the person feels about performing the
action (i.e., subjective norm), and whether the person feels in control of performing the
action (i.e., perceived behavioral control).
TRA and TPB are often applied in behavioral research. Figure 3.2 shows the
combined model of TRA and TPB, which includes the following key concepts:
•

Behavioral Beliefs. This concept explores people’s motivations of a

particular behavior in terms of the behavior’s outcome. In fact, people tend to associate
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the performance of a particular behavior with a set of outcomes or features. For instance,
if a person believes that preparation for a test leads to success, the behavioral belief is
that preparation is associated with success whereas no preparation is associated with
failure.
•

Evaluations of the Behavioral Outcome. This concept refers to how people

perceive and evaluate the potential outcomes of performing a behavior.
•

Attitudes. It is one of the key determinants of behavioral intention and

addresses the way people feel about a particular behavior. Attitudes are influenced by
behavioral beliefs and evaluation of the behavioral outcome.
•

Normative Beliefs. It refers to a person’s perception of social normative

pressures or other relevant beliefs that determine whether or not he or she should perform
the behavior.
•

Motivation to Comply. This concept focuses on whether a person will

comply with social normative pressures.
•

Subjective Norms. Ajzen (1991) defines this term as “perceived social

pressure to perform or not perform the behavior”. It is one of the key determinants of
behavioral intention. It refers to the fact that one’s perception of the particular behavior is
influenced by his or her surrounding, such as family members and friends.
•

Control Beliefs. It refers to an individual’s beliefs about the presence of

factors that may assist or impede the performance of the particular behavior.
•

Perceived Power. This concept refers to the perceived presence of factors

that may assist or impede the performance of the particular behavior.
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•

Perceived Control. It is one of the key determinants of behavioral

intention. It is defined as a person’s perceived ease or difficulty of performing the
particular behavior.
•

Intention. This refers to the motivational factors that influence a given

behavior where the stronger the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely the
behavior will be performed.

Figure 3.2. Theory of Planned Behavior and Theory of Reasoned Action

3.1.3. Technology Acceptance Model. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is
an adaptation of TRA/TPB and it is an information system theory that models users’
acceptance of information technology (Davis et al., 1989). TAM replaces some of
TRA/TPB’s measures of attitude with two technology acceptance measures, perceived
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ease of use and perceived usefulness. The model proposes that users’ acceptance of a
system is directly determined by behavioral intention to use the system, which is in turn
determined by the users’ attitudes toward the technology and the perceived usefulness of
the technology. Moreover, attitude and perceived usefulness are influenced by perceived
ease of use (see Figure 3.3). Perceived usefulness reflects an individual’s belief in the
system, and it is positively related to attitude toward using the system and behavioral
intention to use the system. Perceived ease of use is defined as a person’s belief that
using the technology will be free of effort (Davis et al., 1989).

Figure 3.3. Technology Acceptance Model

3.2. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH MODEL
Prospect theory purports that individuals weigh losses more heavily than gains.
Hence, the framing of outcomes affects users’ perceptions because losses exert a stronger
influence over people’s perceptions than gains. We extend the term “gains and losses” to
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two different and opposite ways to present information. When a situation is framed
negatively, the negative consequences or attributes are emphasized. When a situation is
positively framed, the positive aspects are more salient. For example, the Asian Disease
problem can be presented as “400 of 600 people will be saved” or “200 of 600 people
will die”; similarly, a piece of meat can be presented as “75% fat-free” or “25% fat”.
Based on prospect theory, we hypothesize that the framing of the possible
consequences of a risky action affects users’ perceived risk. Specifically, negative
framing leads to greater perceived risk than positive framing because losses exert a
stronger influence over people’s perceptions than gains. Positive framing is in the domain
of gains as it highlights the assurance of keeping the computer system secure whereas
negative framing is in the domain of losses as it accentuates the hazard to computer
security. Such an explanation is consistent with prospect theory and it extends prospect
theory by suggesting that the perception of risks occurs prior to behavior. Based on
prospect theory, people perceive losses greater than gains, and hence, the perception of
risks is higher in negative framing (which involves losses) than positive framing (which
involves gains).
H1: Risk perception is higher in negative framing than positive framing.
Several researchers replicated Tversky and Kahneman’s “Asian disease problem”
study to extend prospect theory. Levin et al. (1990) found that different amounts of
evidence in the Asian Disease problem affected decision-making. In fact, “1 out of 100
people will die” was found to be less trustable than “100 out of 10000 people will die”
because the former might be considered a contingency whereas the latter represents a
more reliable probability of death. Wang and Johnston (1995) further extended the
“Asian Disease Problem” study by varying the number of people (6, 60, 600 and 6000) in
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both gain and loss conditions. Their results revealed that under small base size conditions
(i.e., 2 out of 6 people live and 20 out of 60 people live), participants tended to be more
risk seeking than those who were presented with the large base size conditions (200 out
of 600 people live and 2000 out of 6000 people live). Hence, the following hypothesis is
proposed.
H2: The greater the base size, the higher the perceived risk.
The findings from Wang and Johnston’s (1995) study provide further evidence on
how base size influences the effect of framing. Their results demonstrate that base size
interacts with framing effects to influence risk-taking behavior. When the base size was 6
and 60, the percentages of subjects who chose the risky option in negative and positive
framing were very similar (64% and 70% respectively for base size of 6 and 68% and
65% respectively for base size of 60) but the difference between negative and positive
framing increases with larger base sizes. In the larger base size conditions (600 and
6000), the framing effect led to more risk-taking decisions in negative framing than
positive framing. This effect was stronger in the large base size conditions than the small
base size conditions. A possible reason is that subjects valued individuals in a small
group context more heavily than individuals in a large group context (Wang, 1996). In
other words, in a small base size context, people are able to ignore the irrelevant cue of
framing and thus the framing effect does not affect their choices.
According to this extension of Prospect Theory, we hypothesize that risk
information is more powerful when it is based on a large base size. As base size
increases, the effect of framing on perceived risk becomes stronger. In other words,
people’s perception of risks in positive and negative framing widens with increased base
size.
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H3: As base size increases, framing effect on perceived risk becomes stronger.
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), and
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) provide theoretical foundation for us to examine
users’ behavior on software download. According to these theories, behavioral intention
is the key predictor of actual behavior. In turn, behavioral intention is determined by
three factors in TPB (i.e., attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived
behavioral control) and by two factors in TAM (i.e., attitude toward using and perceived
usefulness). In the TPB/TRA model, attitude is one of the key determinants of behavioral
intention and addresses the way people feel about a particular behavior. Attitudes are
influenced by behavioral beliefs and evaluation of the behavioral outcome, and attitudes
refer to one’s judgment about whether it is good/safe or bad/dangerous to perform a
behavior. In the computer security context, where the particular download behavior is
associated with computer security risks, the download intention is the key predictor of the
download decision. In other words, the stronger the intention to engage in the download
behavior, the more likely the user will make the decision to perform the download action.
Moreover, the download intention is affected by users’ attitude toward
downloading the software, and perceived risk refers to users’ attitude regarding the
download behavior. We thus hypothesize that the higher the perceived risk, the lower the
behavioral download intention, which in turn, decreases the likelihood of performing the
download behavior.
H4: The greater the perceived risk, the lower the download intention.
H5: Download intention is positively associated with the download decision.
Stimulus-Response theory of behavior deals with people's response to a stimulus.
Psychologists increasingly question the view that human behavior cannot be completely
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explained without taking the internal/mental processes into consideration. The StimulusOrganism-Response (SOR) theory (Woodworth, 1918), as an extension of the StimuliResponse formula, suggests that a stimulus may arouse different behavior or response
depending on the state of the “organism”. The “organism” mediates the relationship
between the stimulus and the human’s behavior. Basically, the stimulus elicits human’s
behavior based on a mental process of people. SOR theory has been applied successfully
in the IS field to explain customer behavior in the e-commerce context and on social
media usage (Jeong et al., 2009). It also provides a lucid outline to study how the framing
of a risky scenario influences users’ download intention and decision. Thus, the SOR
model can work as an overarching framework in this study.
Drawing on SOR Theory, Prospect Theory, TBA, TPB, and TAM, five
hypotheses have been generated and the research model is shown in Figure 3.4. Framing
and base size of risk information act as the external stimuli that influence users’
perceived risk, which further influences users’ download intention and behavior, which
refer to the response due to the stimuli.

Figure 3.4. Research Model
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A 2 (positive/negative framing) × 3 (small, medium and large base size) mixed
factorial experimental design was conducted to explore the relationship of framing and
base size of computer security risk information on users’ behavior.

4.1. SUBJECTS
Research subjects were recruited through the crowdsourcing website, Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Basically, anyone can complete the tasks on the Amazon
Mechanical Turk website. The only requirement to carry out the tasks on the Internet and
collect payment from the requester is to be at least 18 years of age.

4.2. RESEARCH PROCEDURES
We used a scenario-based survey embedded in an experiment to study users’
download behavior. An online survey containing the stimuli in the form of a
questionnaire was distributed. Subjects were asked to assess five software download
scenarios of which three of them were the experimental stimuli and two of them were
distractors, as mentioned earlier.
The software application in each of the three “within-subjects” scenarios was
associated with a particular computer security risk, i.e., 10% of those who downloaded
the software had their computers infected with viruses, while they differ in their base size
(i.e., number of people who downloaded the software).
We detailed the scenario as a free download of an expensive software in order to
assess the trade-off between risk and money. In order to eliminate the influence of the
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value, type, and importance of one’s personal computer (e.g., important data stored in the
computer, personal attachment to the computer, etc.), we narrated the situation as
follows, which is also presented in Appendix A:
“You just bought a new personal computer and have not installed any software or
stored any file or information on it. You need to install 5 software applications for
a project.
Next, you will be given a series of scenarios. Each scenario is related to
downloading 1 of the 5 software applications. Each of the scenarios is standalone
and independent of one another.”
Then, subjects were provided with different manipulations of a message related to
the computer security risk associated with the download. After reviewing each message,
subjects needed to respond to a series of questions designed to assess their risk
perception, intention, and decision.

4.3. VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION
Framing was operationalized as a between-subjects variable and base size as a
within-subjects variable. All the subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two
(positive or negative) framing conditions. In each framing condition, subjects made a
software download decision for each of three scenarios involving varying base sizes (i.e.,
small, medium and large). Moreover, two scenarios were added as distractors in order to
mask the systematic pattern among the three main scenarios. The five scenarios, which
included the three main scenarios for small, medium and large base size and the two
scenarios serving as distractors, were presented to the subjects in a completely
randomized order.
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4.3.1. Framing. Framing was first studied based on the Asian disease problem,
also referred to as “framing of the options”. Later on, researchers discussed and explored
other types of framing manipulations, such as attribute framing and goal framing (Levin
et al., 1998). As an example of attribute framing, a risky situation can be framed by the
salience of the outcome including the negative or positive aspects. For example, a
download with 10% virus infection rate could be framed in different ways: 9 out of 10
people’s computers were secure vs. 1 out of 10 people’s computers were infected with
viruses. In this study, framing is a between-subjects variable where subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the two framing conditions.
In the positive framing condition, the description of the scenarios focused on the
positive outcome of downloading the software:
“Among X people who downloaded the software:
Y people’s computers were safe and secure”
In the negative framing condition, the scenario focused on the negative outcome
of downloading the software:
“Among X people who downloaded the software:
Z person’s computer was infected with viruses and crashed unexpectedly”
4.3.2. Base Size. Base size is a within-subjects variable. We manipulated three
levels of the base size: 10, 1000, and 100000 (i.e., a difference of 100 times between
levels) in order to observe users’ perceived risk as base size increased. In order to mask
the systematic patterns of the base size manipulations from the subjects, two analogous
scenarios (with different computer security risk levels and frequencies) were inserted as
distractors. The five scenarios were presented in a randomized order to counter-balance
any potential ordering effect.
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In the positively framed condition, subjects made download decisions presented
in Table 4.1. In the negatively framed condition, subjects made download decisions
presented in Table 4.2. The three main scenarios for each of positive and negative
framing conditions are also presented in Appendix B.

Table 4.1. Operationalization of Base Size in Positive Framing
Base Size
Theta Software
(Small Base Size: 10)

Paragraph (Positive Framing)
Among 10 people who downloaded the software:
9 people’s computers were safe and secure

Alpha Software
(Medium Base Size: 1,000)

Among 1,000 people who downloaded the software:
900 people’s computers were safe and secure

Zeta Software
(Large Base Size: 100,000)

Among 100,000 people who downloaded the software:
90,000 people’s computers were safe and secure

Table 4.2. Operationalization of Base Size in Negative Framing
Base Size
Theta Software
(Small Base Size: 10)

Paragraph (Negative Framing)
Among 10 people who downloaded the software:
1 person’s computer was infected with viruses and
crashed unexpectedly

Alpha Software
(Medium Base Size: 1,000)

Among 1,000 people who downloaded the software:
100 people’s computers were infected with viruses
and crashed unexpectedly

Zeta Software
(Large Base Size: 100,000)

Among 100,000 people who downloaded the
software: 10,000 people’s computers were infected
with viruses and crashed unexpectedly
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4.4. MEASUREMENT
After each scenario, a short questionnaire was used to assess perceived risk,
download intention, and download decision. The questionnaire also captured
Cybersecurity Awareness, Internet Structural Assurance, General Risk-taking
Tendencies, Computer Security Risk-taking Tendencies, Self-Efficacy, and the
background and demographic information of the subjects. A manipulation check question
for framing was presented in the questionnaire. Appendix C and Appendix D present the
items in the questionnaire.
4.4.1. Perceived Risk. A three-item scale was developed in this study to assess
perceived risk. The first item was adopted from Weber et al. (2002) and the two other
items were self-developed. The 5-point Likert scale (not at all risky/no risk at all = 1 to
extremely risky/extremely high risk = 5) was used. Table 4.3 shows the items.

Table 4.3. Measurement Scale for Perceived Risk
Measurement Items
(PR1) Please indicate how risky you perceive the action of
downloading this software for free from the uncertified source.
Perceived
Risk

(PR2) Please indicate the level of risk of downloading this software for
free from the uncertified source. (Self-developed)
(PR3) Please rate the riskiness of downloading this software for free
from the uncertified source. (Self-developed)
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4.4.2. Download Intention. Subjects were asked to rate their intention to
download the software. The measurement items for intention were adopted from Ajzen’s
(1991). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used.
Table 4.4 shows the items.

Table 4.4. Measurement Scale for Download Intention
Measurement Items
(DI1) I intend to download this software for free from the uncertified
source.
Download
Intention

(DI2) I plan to download this software for free from the uncertified
source.
(DI3) It is likely that I will download this software for free from the
uncertified source.

4.4.3. Download Decision. After assessing download intention and perceived
risk, subjects were asked to answer a question about their download decision:
What is your choice of downloading this software?
•

Option 1: Download and pay for the expensive software from the certified
source with no security risks

•

Option 2: Download the software for free from this uncertified source with the
security risks indicated above

4.4.4. General Information Security Awareness. Measurement items were
adopted from Bulgurcu et al. (2010) to assess subjects’ general information security
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awareness. The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was
used. Table 4.5 presents the items.

Table 4.5. Measurement Scale for General Information Security Awareness
Measurement Items
General
Information
Security
Awareness

(GISA1) Overall, I am aware of potential security threats and their
negative consequences.
(GISA2) I have sufficient knowledge about the effect of potential
security problems. (Revised from original)
(GISA3) I understand the concerns regarding the risks posed by
information security.

4.4.5. Self-Efficacy. The measurement items for self-efficacy were adopted from
Dinev and Hu (2007) to assess users’ computer security self-efficacy. The 7-point Likert
scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used. Table 4.6 presents the items.

Table 4.6. Measurement Scale for Self-Efficacy
Measurement Items
(SE1) I am confident that I can remove viruses from my computer.
Self-Efficacy (SE2) I am confident that I can prevent unauthorized intrusion into my
computer.
(SE3) I believe I can configure my computer to protect it from viruses.
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4.4.6. Cybersecurity Awareness. The measurement items for cybersecurity
awareness were adopted from Dinev and Hu (2007). The 7-point Likert scale (strongly
disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used. Table 4.7 presents the items.

Table 4.7. Measurement Scale for Cybersecurity Awareness
Measurement Items
(CA1) I follow news and developments about virus technology.
(CA2) I follow news and developments about anti-virus technology.
(Revised from original)
(CA3) I discuss Internet security issues with friends and people around
Cybersecurity me.
Awareness
(CA4) I read about the problems of malicious software intruding into
Internet users’ computers.
(CA5) I seek advice from various sources on anti-virus products.
(Revised from original)
(CA6) I am aware of spyware problems and consequences.

4.4.7. Internet Structural Assurance. The measurement items for internet
structural assurance were adopted from McKnight et al. (2002) to assess subjects’ trust of
the Internet. The 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was
used. Table 4.8 presents the items.
4.4.8. General Risk-Taking Tendencies. The measurement items for general
risk-taking tendencies were adopted from Meertens and Lion (2008). The 7-point Likert
scale (strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used except for item 6 (see Table
4.9).
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Table 4.8. Measurement Scale for Internet Structural Assurance
Measurement Items
(ISA1) The Internet has enough safeguards to make me feel
comfortable using it for online transactions.
Internet
Structural
Assurance

(ISA2) I feel assured that legal structures adequately protect me from
problems on the Internet. (Revised from original)
(ISA3) I feel assured that technological structures adequately protect
me from problems on the Internet. (Revised from original)
(ISA4) I feel confident that technological advances on the Internet
make it safe for me to carry out online transactions.
(ISA5) In general, the Internet is a safe environment to carry out online
transactions.

Table 4.9. Measurement Scale for General Risk-Taking Tendencies
Measurement Items
(GRT1) Safety first. (Reverse coded)
(GRT2) I prefer to avoid risks. (Reverse coded)
General
Risk-taking
Tendencies

(GRT3) I take risks regularly.
(GRT4) I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen. (Reverse
coded)
(GRT5) I enjoy taking risks. (Revised from original)
(GRT6) In general, I view myself as a ... (Risk avoider = 1 to Risk
Seeker = 7)

4.4.9. Computer Security Risk-Taking Tendencies. Based on the measurement
items for general risk-taking tendencies from Meertens and Lion (2008), we developed 7
measurement items for computer security risk-taking tendencies. The 7-point Likert scale
(strongly disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7) was used except for item 7 (see Table 4.10).
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Table 4.10. Measurement Scale for Computer Security Risk-Taking Tendencies
Measurement Items
(CSRT1) I do not take risks with computer security. (Reverse coded)
(CSRT2) I generally avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded)
Computer
Security
Risk-taking
Tendencies

(CSRT3) I play it safe with computer security risks. (Reverse coded)
(CSRT4) I prefer to avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded)
(CSRT5) I am not afraid of taking computer security risks.
(CSRT6) I am willing to take risks with computer security.
(CSRT7) With regard to computer security, I view myself as a ... (Risk
Avoider = 1 to Risk Seeker = 7)

4.4.10. Framing Manipulation Check. The manipulation check question for
framing was developed to assess whether the framing manipulation was effective.
Subjects were asked to make a selection that comprises two options.
In the previous scenarios, what kind of information was provided? (Please check
ALL that apply):
•

Option 1: Number of people’s computers that were safe and secure

•

Option 2: Number of people’s computers that were infected with viruses
and crashed unexpectedly

4.4.11. Subject Background Questionnaire. The background questionnaire
included participants’ demographics (e.g., gender, age, education, major) and Internet
usage habits (e.g., approximately how many hours do you spend online per week?).
Please refer to Appendix D for a complete list of items.
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5. DATA ANALYSIS

Subjects were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In total, 205
people participated in the study, including 75 MTurk master workers and 130 MTurk
non-master workers. Among the 205 participants, 8 master workers and 19 non-master
workers did not pass the manipulation check question and/or attention check questions.
The final sample size of the study is 178 after removing those invalid data points.
We utilized SPSS software to analyze the data collected. This section presents the
demographic information of the subjects and the reliability and validity of the
measurement. Factor analysis and validity checks on the measurement scales were
conducted and the hypotheses were assessed using repeated measures ANOVA and
mixed model regression.

5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF SUBJECTS
The demographic details of the subjects are summarized in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects
Gender
Male
Female

47.8%
52.2%
Age

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64

5.1%
34.3%
29.8%
17.4%
10.1%
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Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects (cont.)
65-74
75-84
85 or older

3.4%
0.0%
0.0%
Race and Ethnicity

White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other

70.2%
10.1%
1.7%
13.5%
0.6%
3.9%
Marital Status

Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never Married

41.0%
0.6%
10.1%
2.8%
45.5%
Education Level

Less than high school degree
High school graduate (including GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree in college (2-year)
Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
Master's degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree (JD, MD)
Employment Status
Employed full time
Employed part time
Unemployed looking for work
Unemployed not looking for work
Retired
Student
Occupation
Management, professional, and related
Sales and office
Farming, fishing, and forestry
Government
Retired
Unemployed

0.6%
7.9%
15.7%
11.8%
46.1%
14.6%
2.8%
0.6%
70.8%
15.7%
2.8%
5.1%
3.4%
2.2%
46.1%
23%
6.7%
3.4%
7.9%
12.9%
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Table 5.1. Summary of Demographic Details of Subjects (cont.)
Personal Income (Previous Year, Before Taxes)
Less than $10,000
13.5%
$10,000 to $29,999
24.2%
$30,000 to $49,999
24.2%
$50,000 to $69,999
18%
$70,000 to $89,999
12.4%
$90,000 to $109,999
2.8%
$110,000 to $129,999
2.8%
$130,000 to $149,999
0.6%
$150,000 or more
1.1%
Prefer not to disclose
0.6%
Family Income (Previous Year, Before Taxes)
Less than $10,000
6.7%
$10,000 to $49,999
36.5%
$50,000 to $99,999
39.9%
$100,000 to $149,999
10.1%
$150,000 to $199,999
2.8%
$200,000 to $249,999
1.7%
$250,000 or more
1.1%
Prefer not to disclose
1.1%
Disposable Income (Per Month)
Less Than $100
20.8%
$100 - $500
38.8%
$501 - $1000
19.1%
$1001 - $2000
14.6%
More Than $2000
6.7%
Time Spent Online (Per Week)
1-5 hours
3.9%
6 - 10 hours
12.9%
11-15 hours
13.5%
16-20 hours
14.6%
20+ hours
55.1%
Frequency of Software Download from Unknown Sources
Never
50.0%
Sometimes
43.3%
About half of the time
2.8%
Most of the time
3.4%
Always
0.6%
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5.2. MEASUREMENT VALIDATION
To evaluate convergent and discriminant validity for the constructs in the
questionnaire, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was carried out. The EFA results using
Varimax Rotation and Principal Component Analysis are shown in Table 5.2. An eightfactor structure was generated with eigenvalues greater than 1.0.

Table 5.2. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis (with all measurements)
Component
DI1_L
DI3_L
DI2_L
DI2_M
DI1_M
DI1_S
DI3_M
DI3_S
DI2_S
PR3_S
PR1_S
PR2_S
PR1_M
PR2_M
PR3_M
PR1_L
PR3_L
PR2_L
GRT5
GRT6
GRT3

1
0.878
0.874
0.871
0.857
0.850
0.841
0.840
0.833
0.821
-0.197
-0.231
-0.259
-0.316
-0.285
-0.263
-0.316
-0.318
-0.309
0.108
0.301
0.226

2
-0.225
-0.228
-0.251
-0.297
-0.316
-0.326
-0.307
-0.331
-0.359
0.895
0.879
0.868
0.857
0.854
0.842
0.760
0.733
0.708
-0.132
-0.097
-0.151

3
0.202
0.180
0.174
0.235
0.243
0.238
0.241
0.196
0.219
-0.120
-0.147
-0.112
-0.135
-0.144
-0.134
-0.114
-0.156
-0.140
0.845
0.823
0.810

4
-0.027
-0.008
0.023
0.084
0.062
0.088
0.090
0.116
0.062
0.014
-0.004
0.003
-0.011
-0.059
-0.060
0.103
0.125
0.055
-0.016
-0.037
0.112

5
0.075
0.079
0.068
0.100
0.096
0.099
0.073
0.095
0.089
-0.089
-0.112
-0.121
-0.148
-0.076
-0.069
-0.121
-0.139
-0.131
-0.050
-0.010
0.057

6
-0.047
-0.069
-0.048
0.022
0.043
0.009
0.034
0.001
-0.016
-0.018
-0.022
-0.020
0.029
0.044
0.050
0.097
0.052
0.089
0.174
0.066
0.148

7
0.120
0.109
0.124
0.114
0.152
0.041
0.127
0.017
0.050
-0.041
-0.038
0.007
-0.080
-0.096
-0.105
-0.049
-0.084
-0.064
-0.021
-0.013
0.036

8
-0.185
-0.211
-0.179
-0.021
0.004
0.141
0.029
0.147
0.165
-0.162
-0.206
-0.178
0.072
0.017
0.079
0.429
0.455
0.468
0.031
0.007
0.050
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Table 5.2. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis (with all measurements) (cont.)
GRT2
0.274 -0.120
0.785
0.089
0.073
GRT4
0.024 -0.102
0.685
0.029
0.158
GRT1
0.289 -0.185
0.660 -0.001
0.035
SE3
0.138 -0.056
0.088
0.804
0.141
SE1
0.311 -0.066
0.182
0.743
0.151
SE2
0.185 -0.027
0.055
0.716
0.287
GISA2
0.033 -0.056
0.019
0.768
0.090
GISA1
-0.221 -0.017 -0.083
0.658
0.125
GISA3
-0.077
0.218 -0.051
0.652
0.083
ISA4
0.127 -0.111
0.025
0.154
0.811
ISA3
0.246 -0.114
0.043
0.118
0.791
ISA1
0.018 -0.127
0.091
0.164
0.786
ISA5
-0.105 -0.150
0.066
0.225
0.692
ISA2
0.349 -0.134
0.184 -0.004
0.671
CA1
-0.073 -0.039
0.081
0.244
0.036
CA2
-0.035 -0.005
0.050
0.238
0.012
CA3
0.065 -0.001
0.023
0.089
0.051
CA5
-0.016
0.094
0.085
0.116 -0.032
CA4
0.013
0.089 -0.036
0.370
0.003
CA6
-0.134
0.125 -0.149
0.702
0.011
CSRT2
0.410 -0.138
0.519 -0.110
0.081
CSRT3
0.450 -0.114
0.421 -0.176
0.073
CSRT6
0.401 -0.199
0.482 -0.009
0.131
CSRT4
0.471 -0.134
0.423 -0.083
0.114
CSRT1
0.436 -0.152
0.436 -0.016
0.163
CSRT5
0.377 -0.167
0.550
0.023
0.103
CSRT7
0.554 -0.015
0.595 -0.051
0.103
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

-0.029
-0.022
-0.149
0.079
0.000
0.086
0.243
0.327
0.291
0.044
-0.060
-0.064
0.094
0.127
0.816
0.815
0.712
0.67
0.571
0.335
-0.093
-0.162
0.068
-0.130
0.012
0.057
-0.019

0.133
0.054
0.297
0.000
0.036
0.053
-0.005
-0.050
-0.340
0.014
0.046
0.080
0.130
-0.123
0.146
0.195
-0.157
-0.159
-0.102
-0.034
0.587
0.575
0.557
0.513
0.472
0.311
0.218

-0.071
-0.010
-0.100
0.156
0.090
0.213
-0.075
-0.252
-0.172
-0.001
0.022
-0.112
-0.090
0.214
0.099
0.097
0.005
-0.216
0.091
-0.067
-0.111
0.030
0.031
-0.057
0.013
-0.084
0.122
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As shown in Table 5.2, Self-Efficacy (SE) and General Information Security
Awareness (GISA) load together. In reviewing the items for GISA, it is noted that they
tapped on knowledge and awareness of information security, and hence, are very similar
to SE. Since there is another measurement for computer security awareness (i.e.,
Cybersecurity Awareness (CA)) that was assessed based on actions and behavior
associated with awareness of cybersecurity, all items of GISA were dropped while those
of CA were retained. However, since item CA6 did not load well, it was removed. In
addition, Computer Security Risk-Taking Tendencies (CSRT) loaded with General RiskTaking Tendencies (GRT), and hence, we decided to retain GRT and discard CSRT. The
rest of the measurement items loaded onto their target factors, which suggests good
construct validity (Cook, et al., 1979).
After removing construct GISA, CSRT, and item CA6, we ran the factor analysis
again. Table 5.3 provides the results of EFA after the adjustments.

Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (after removing GISA, CSRT, and CA6)

DI1_L
DI3_L
DI2_L
DI2_M
DI1_M
DI1_S
DI3_M
DI3_S
DI2_S

1
0.892
0.887
0.883
0.863
0.857
0.845
0.840
0.827
0.819

2
-0.250
-0.254
-0.272
-0.305
-0.325
-0.312
-0.315
-0.319
-0.346

Component
3
4
0.187
0.093
0.166
0.102
0.166
0.090
0.220
0.110
0.229
0.102
0.223
0.080
0.217
0.096
0.171
0.091
0.203
0.080

5
-0.058
-0.075
-0.053
0.027
0.044
0.040
0.013
0.009
-0.013

6
-0.028
-0.019
0.021
0.115
0.115
0.138
0.165
0.191
0.166
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Table 5.3. Results of Factor Analysis (after removing GISA, CSRT, and CA6) (cont.)
PR3_S
-0.186
0.884
-0.104
-0.064
PR1_S
-0.312
0.864
-0.128
-0.149
PR2_S
-0.219
0.863
-0.129
-0.086
PR2_M
-0.277
0.859
-0.135
-0.074
PR1_M
-0.245
0.854
-0.089
-0.096
PR3_M
-0.259
0.852
-0.123
-0.074
PR1_L
-0.320
0.801
-0.105
-0.148
PR3_L
-0.327
0.780
-0.147
-0.165
PR2_L
-0.314
0.754
-0.129
-0.162
GRT5
0.130
-0.129
0.835
-0.040
GRT3
0.246
-0.145
0.803
0.074
GRT6
0.310
-0.108
0.800
-0.006
GRT2
0.299
-0.129
0.792
0.096
GRT1
0.324
-0.201
0.700
0.065
GRT4
0.043
-0.105
0.690
0.166
ISA4
0.121
-0.107
0.022
0.819
ISA1
0.026
-0.133
0.088
0.808
ISA3
0.237
-0.119
0.022
0.789
ISA5
-0.099
-0.152
0.079
0.717
ISA2
0.327
-0.129
0.122
0.634
CA1
-0.056
-0.016
0.123
0.058
CA2
-0.014
0.016
0.099
0.039
CA3
0.048
-0.003
-0.020
0.049
CA5
-0.033
0.064
0.033
-0.015
CA4
-0.008
0.105
-0.054
0.011
SE3
0.096
-0.031
0.064
0.165
SE1
0.274
-0.053
0.155
0.182
SE2
0.140
-0.011
0.017
0.302
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.

-0.016
0.025
-0.022
0.032
-0.018
0.040
0.103
0.066
0.091
0.170
0.155
0.075
-0.013
-0.157
-0.018
0.057
-0.060
-0.051
0.108
0.123
0.831
0.826
0.736
0.706
0.625
0.205
0.122
0.204

-0.080
-0.050
-0.113
-0.113
-0.093
-0.092
0.163
0.191
0.135
-0.029
0.113
0.012
0.100
0.029
0.044
0.125
0.089
0.131
0.155
0.078
0.146
0.134
0.011
-0.026
0.305
0.847
0.786
0.777
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Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of at least 0.70 indicate good reliability of the
constructs (Nunnally et al., 1967). All of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients shown in
Table 5.4 are above 0.7, suggesting that all the measures and their respective
measurement components are reliable.

Table 5.4. Results of Reliability Analysis
Variable

Cronbach's Alpha

Download Intention (DI) (3 items)

0.986

Perceived Risk (PR) (3 items)

0.972

Self-Efficacy (SE) (3 items)

0.870

Cybersecurity Awareness (CA) (5 items)

0.819

Internet Structural Assurance (ISA) (5 items)

0.848

General Risk-Taking Tendencies (GRT) (6 items)

0.899

5.3. REPEATED MEASURES ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Repeated measures refer to measures that are repeated with the same subject.
Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) is also referred to as within-subjects
ANOVA. Repeated measures ANOVA is used to assess overall differences between
related means differences in mean scores for two or more within-subjects conditions.
Moreover, it is appropriate to use a repeated measures ANOVA only if the data "passes"
five assumptions (Field, 2009).
1. The dependent variable should be measured at the continuous level (i.e., interval
or ratio scale; ordinal scale is also acceptable).
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2. The within-subjects variable should consist of at least two levels.
3. There should be no significant outliers in the related groups. The problem with
outliers is that they might have a negative effect on the repeated measures
ANOVA, distorting the differences between the related groups (whether
increasing or decreasing the scores on the dependent variable), and can reduce the
accuracy of the results.
4. The distribution of the dependent variable in the two or more related groups
should be approximately normally distributed. However, this assumption is not
needed if the sample size is greater than 25.
5. The variances of the differences between all combinations of related groups
should be equal or approximately equal.
5.3.1. Check for Assumptions. The sample size of this study is 178. Base Size is
the within-subjects variable that has three levels (small, medium and large); framing is
the between-subjects factor with two levels (positive and negative); and the outcome or
dependent factor is perceived risk which is measured at the continuous level (i.e., ordinal
scale can be approximated to be continuous). Thus, the data meet assumptions 1, 2, and 4.
To test assumptions 3, we ran analyses in SPSS to detect possible outliers at each
level of the repeated measures in our data. The results of outlier detection are provided in
Figure 5.1-5.3.
SPSS makes a distinction between outliers that are more than 1.5 box lengths
from one hinge of the box (using a circle) and outliers that are more than 3 box lengths
from a hinge (using an asterisk). Based on an examination of the boxplots, SPSS does not
identify any outliers since there is no circle or asterisk in Figures 5.1-5.3. Thus, our data
meet assumption 3 of Repeated Measures ANOVA.
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Figure 5.1. SPSS Explore Output: Boxplot for Perceived Risk in Small Base Size

Figure 5.2. SPSS Explore Output: Boxplot for Perceived Risk in Medium Base Size

Figure 5.3. SPSS Explore Output: Boxplot for Perceived Risk in Large Base Size
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Assumption 5 requires the variances of the differences between all combinations
of related groups to be equal (i.e., Sphericity). Sphericity is tested with the Mauchly’s test
(Mauchly, 1940). When the probability of Mauchly’s test is greater than a (i.e., p > 0.05
with a usually set to 0.05), the variances are equal and thus sphericity has not been
violated. Since the results of Mauchly’s test of our data show that sphericity is violated
(i.e., p < 0.05), we use alternatives ways for estimating the amount of sphericity. In
SPSS, three alternative methods are also generated: Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt,
and the lower-bound (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959; Huynh & Feldt, 1976). If Mauchly’s
test of sphericity is violated, these methods are used to correct the within-subjects tests.
The Greenhouse-Geisser and Huynd-Feldt corrections estimate 𝜀 in order to correct the
degrees of freedom of the F-distribution. These corrections have elicited a more accurate
significance value as they increase the p-value to compensate for the fact that the test is
too liberal when sphericity is violated. Moreover, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction
tends to underestimate 𝜀 when 𝜀 is close to 1 and thus it is a conservative correction,
whereas the Huynd-Feldt correction tends to overestimate 𝜀 so it is a more liberal
correction.
5.3.2. Results of Repeated Measures ANOVA. Given that there is a withinsubjects factor (base size) and a between-subjects factor (framing) in the research design,
we used the repeated measures ANOVA for testing H1, H2 and H3.
5.3.2.1. Tests of between-subjects effects (framing). Section 5.3.2.1 presents the
results of the main effect of Framing, a between-subjects factor. Table 5.5 shows the
descriptive statistics for the effect of Positive and Negative Framing on Perceived Risk.
As shown in Table 5.5, the mean for Perceived Risk is higher in Negative Framing than
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for Positive Framing. Figure 5.4 shows a diagram of the main effect of framing across all
three levels of base size in negative framing and positive framing.

Table 5.5. Descriptive Statistics of Between-Subjects Effects for Framing
95% Confidence Interval

Framing

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Negative

3.83

1.02

3.63

4.03

Positive

3.10

1.08

2.91

3.30

Figure 5.4. Main Effect of Framing Across Three Levels of Base Size

In addition, Table 5.6 shows the results of the Framing main effect on Perceived
Risk, along with 17 covariates in the following three categories:
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•

Demographic Factors (10): Gender, Age, Ethnicity, Marital Status,

Education, Employment Status, Occupation, Annual Personal Income, Annual
Household Income, and Disposable Income or Allowance.
•

Computer Usage (2): Hours Spent Online Per Week, Frequency of

Download Software from Unknown Sources.
•

Individual Traits (4): Internet Structural Assurance, General Risk-Taking

Tendencies, Cybersecurity Awareness, and Self-Efficacy.
In Table 5.6, Sum of Squares is the sum of the squares of the deviations from the
means. Degree of Freedom (df) represents the degree of freedom of the coefficients for
the test. Mean Square is found by dividing the Sum of Squares by the Degree of
Freedom. F refers to the ratio of two independent chi-squared variables divided by their
respective degrees of freedom. Sig. refers to the 2-tailed p-value to test if the value of the
null hypothesis is 0. For our data analysis, we compared each p-value to our preselected
alpha threshold of 0.05. Coefficients that have a p-value less than the preselected alpha
value is considered to be statistically significant.
Framing. We found that framing has a significant effect on Perceived Risk, p <
0.001. Subjects who were in Negative Framing exhibited greater Perceived Risk than
those in Positive Framing (Mean = 3.83, SD = 1.08) than subjects who were in Positive
Framing (Mean = 3.10, SD = 1.02). Hence, H1 is supported.
Internet Structural Assurance (ISA). We found a significant effect of Internet
Structural Assurance on Perceived Risk, p = 0.004 (< 0.05). Subjects who are high in ISA
perceived lower risks of downloading the software for free from the uncertified source.
General Risk-Taking Tendencies (GRT). We found a significant effect of General
Risk-Taking Tendencies on Perceived Risk, p < 0.001. Subjects who are high in General
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Risk-Taking Tendencies perceived lower risks of downloading the software for free from
the uncertified source.

Table 5.6. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Intercept

Sum of
Squares
89.33

Framing

49.90

1

49.9

24.42

0.000

Self-Efficacy
Cybersecurity
Awareness
Internet Structural
Assurance
General RiskTaking Tendencies
Gender

0.47

1

0.47

0.23

0.632

1.72

1

1.72

0.84

0.361

16.60

1

16.60

8.12

0.005

31.93

1

31.93

15.62

0.000

0.85

1

0.85

0.41

0.521

Age

4.92

1

4.92

2.41

0.123

Ethnicity

13.36

1

13.36

6.54

0.012

Marital Status

0.60

1

0.60

0.29

0.589

Degree

0.98

1

0.98

0.48

0.489

Employment Status

7.35

1

7.35

3.60

0.060

Occupation

0.00

1

0.00

0.00

0.974

Personal Income

0.19

1

0.19

0.09

0.763

Household Income

0.76

1

0.76

0.37

0.543

Disposable Income

15.03

1

15.03

7.36

0.007

Hour Spent Online
Frequency of
Download Software
from Unknown
Sources

0.47

1

0.47

0.23

0.633

4.47

1

4.47

2.19

0.141

Source

df

Mean Square

F

1

89.33

43.71

Sig.
(2-tailed)
0.000
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All other covariates with the exception of disposable income and ethnicity are not
significant. Disposable income and ethnicity have effects on perceived risk of users.
People who have the lowest and highest disposable income brackets perceived the
lightest risks. Since we have a large number of white subjects (70%), we compared them
with the rest of the subjects and found a difference in their risk perceptions.
5.3.2.2. Tests of within-subjects effects (base size). In this section, Table 5.7
provides the descriptive statistics and shows the means for Perceived Risk at the different
levels of Base Size and Framing. Table 5.8 shows the results of repeated measures
ANOVA which indicates the overall significance of the within-subjects effect of Base
Size and the interaction effect of Framing and Base Size. As mentioned in Section 5.3.1,
since our data violate the assumption of sphericity (i.e., equal variances), we use the
values of the "Greenhouse-Geisser" test instead of “Sphericity Assumed”.

Table 5.7. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Risk at Three Levels of Base Size

Base Size

Mean

Std.
Deviation

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower Upper
Bound Bound

Small

3.31

1.15

3.15

3.47

Medium

3.45

1.07

3.30

3.60

Large

3.64

1.09

3.49

3.79

Framing

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Negative
Positive
Total
Negative
Positive
Total
Negative
Positive
Total

3.68
2.94
3.31
3.80
3.10
3.45
4.01
3.27
3.64

1.08
1.10
1.15
0.99
1.04
1.07
0.97
1.08
1.09
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Table 5.8. Tests of Within-Subjects Effects of Base Size

Sphericity Assumed

Sum of
Squares
9.73

F

Sig.

2.00

Mean
Square
4.86

17.07

0.00

Greenhouse-Geisser

9.73

1.76

5.53

17.07

0.00

Huynh-Feldt

9.73

1.79

5.44

17.07

0.00

Lower-bound

9.73

1.00

9.73

17.07

0.00

Sphericity Assumed

0.04

2.00

0.02

0.07

0.93

Greenhouse-Geisser

0.04

1.76

0.02

0.07

0.91

Huynh-Feldt

0.04

1.79

0.02

0.07

0.91

Lower-bound

0.04

1.00

0.04

0.07

0.79

Sphericity Assumed

100.31

352.00

0.29

Greenhouse-Geisser

100.31

309.88

0.32

Huynh-Feldt

100.31

314.55

0.32

Lower-bound

100.31

176

0.57

Source

Base
Size

Framing
* Base
Size

Error
(Base
Size)

df

Base size. According to the results of repeated measures ANOVA with a
Greenhouse-Geisser correction presented in Table 5.7, the mean scores for Perceived
Risk are statistically different (p < 0.001) between the different levels of Base Size. The
results illustrate that subjects perceived greater risk (Mean = 3.64, SD = 1.09) when
provided the scenario with large base size than with small base size (Mean = 3.31, SD =
1.15) and medium base size (Mean = 3.45, SD = 1.07). Since the overall ANOVA results
for the three levels of base size are significant, we also ran the post-hoc tests to see which
levels of Base Size are different. According to the post-hoc tests presented in Table 5.9,
there is a significant effect across every level of Base Size on Perceived Risk. We can see
that there is a significant difference in Perceived Risk between small and medium Base

49
Size (p = 0.01 < 0.05, MD = 0.14), between small and large Base Size (p < 0.001, MD =
0.33), and between medium and large Base Size (p < 0.001, MD = 0.19). From the Mean
Difference column, we can see that as the Base Size increases, Perceived Risk is also
significantly increased. Hence, H2 is supported.

Table 5.9. Results of the Bonferroni Post-Hoc Tests
Mean
Difference

Std.
Error

Sig.

Medium

-0.14

0.05

0.01

-0.24

-0.04

Large

-0.33

0.07

0.00

-0.46

-0.20

Small

0.14

0.05

0.01

0.04

0.24

Large

-0.19

0.05

0.00

-0.29

-0.09

Small

0.33

0.07

0.00

0.20

0.46

Medium

0.19

0.05

0.00

0.09

0.29

Base Size

Small

Medium

Large

95% Confidence
Interval for Difference
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

Framing*Base Size. According to the results of repeated measures ANOVA with
a Greenhouse-Geisser correction presented in Table 5.7, there is no interaction effect
between Framing and Base Size on Perceived Risk (p = 0.909 > 0.05). Hence, H3 is not
supported.
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5.4. MIXED MODEL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We measured Perceived Risk, Download Intention, and Download Decision as
repeated measures at small, medium, and large levels of base size in the study. As
Repeated Measures ANOVA can only treat a repeated measures as a categorical factor,
we conducted Mixed Model Regression Analysis to test H4 and H5.
A mixed model is a statistical model containing both fixed effects and random
effects. They are particularly useful in settings where repeated measurements are made
on the same statistical units (longitudinal study), or where measurements are made on
clusters of related statistical units (Lindstrom & Bates, 1990). In the Mixed Model
approach, each subject has three rows of data. A new column is generated to indicate the
level of Base Size and the outcomes (i.e., Perceived Risk, Download Intention, and
Download Decision) are single variables. Covariates have repeated values across the
three rows of data. This is called the long format, or Stacked data, and this changes the
unit of analysis from the subject to each measurement occasion.
The results of Mixed Model Regression Analysis for Download Intention are
presented in Table 5.10, and the results of Mixed Model Regression Analysis for
Download Decision are presented in Table 5.11.

Table 5.10. Tests of Perceived Risk Effects on Download Decision
Source

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

Sig.

Intercept

1

463.72

363.30

0.00

Perceived Risk

12

403.64

25.64

0.00

a. Dependent Variable: Download Intention.
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Download Intention. From the result of the analysis as shown in Table 5.10, we
found a significant effect of Perceived Risk on Download Intention, p < 0.001. Subjects
who perceived greater risks have lower download intentions. Hence, H4 is supported.

Table 5.11. Tests of Download Intention Effects on Download Behavior
Source

Numerator df

Denominator df

F

Sig.

Intercept

1

411.36

3612.96

0.00

Download Intention

18

436.36

62.32

0.00

a. Dependent Variable: Download Decision.

Download Decision. From the result of the analysis as shown in Table 5.11, we
found a significant effect of Download Intention on Download Decision, p < 0.001.
Download intentions are positively associated with download decisions. Hence, H5 is
supported.
Table 5.12 summarizes the results of hypothesis testing. In sum, H1, H2, H4, and
H5 are supported but H3 is not supported. The next section discusses the findings.
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Table 5.12. Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis

Supported?

H1: Risk perception is higher in negative framing than positive
framing.

Yes

H2: The greater the base size, the higher the perceived risk.

Yes

H3: As base size increases, framing effect on perceived risk
becomes stronger.
H4: The greater the perceived risk, the lower the download
intention.
H5: Download intention is positively associated with download
decision.

No
Yes
Yes
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6. DISCUSSIONS

The results of our study provide further evidence to the literature that framing
influences users’ perceptions of risks. In addition, the results demonstrate that base size,
manipulated through the number of people who downloaded the software, influences
users’ perceived risks. However, the results do not demonstrate the interaction effect of
base size and framing on users’ behavior found by Wang and Johnston (1995) as the
framing effect in our study is consistent across all base size conditions. Hence, based on
our study, base size does not moderate the effect of framing on perceived risk. The
findings also suggest that users’ perceived risk has a significant effect on users’
download intention, and users’ download intention is positively associated with users’
download decision.
First, negative framing leads to higher perceived risk than positive framing.
According to Prospect Theory, a loss is assessed at a relatively greater value than a gain.
The finding is in line with Prospect Theory and suggests that users’ perception of
computer security risk is higher in the negative framing condition than in the positive
framing condition.
Second, base size has a significant impact on users’ perceived risk. The larger the
base size, the greater the perceived risk. As base size increases, the perceived probability
of virus infection increases and thus, users’ perceived risk increases.
Moreover, the results have shown that the greater the perceived risk, the lower the
intention to download software applications that involve computer security risks. Hence,
providing computer security risk information with negative framing is an effective way to
reduce or minimize computer security risk-taking behavior.
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Hence, users are less likely to download software applications when the risk
information is framed negatively and when the risk information is presented with a large
base size.
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7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The study has several limitations, which can be resolved or addressed in future
research.
First, the data collection of this study was conducted on MTurk to ensure a
diverse sample across different age groups, ethnicity, occupation, etc. However, MTurk
does not operate in a controlled environment, thus we cannot ensure subjects were
focused and not distracted by interference in their surroundings during the study. In
future research, we would like to recruit subjects to participate in a controlled laboratory
experiment to validate the results.
Second, the study utilized a scenario-based survey approach to manipulate the
experimental scenarios. It did not simulate any actual uncertified software downloads
which could have made the experimental scenarios more realistic. This limitation could
be overcome in future research by simulating more realistic-looking websites involving
decisions on uncertified software downloads and hence, make the experimental
conditions look more realistic or similar to those encountered in real life.
Third, many participants felt that the questionnaire is a bit long as we have a large
number of demographic questions. We intended to use the demographic items as
covariates in our study, so we used a fairly comprehensive set of subject demographic
questions. However, since demographic questions are generally straight-forward to
answer (i.e., do not require much thought or cognitive processing to answer them), we
placed them at the end of the questionnaire because errors due to fatigue were less likely
to happen for demographic questions compared to other types of questions. Furthermore,
we included attention check questions and eliminated data points that were problematic
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due to lack of attention by the subjects. Future studies can overcome this potential
limitation by further refining the demographic items.
Fourth, we captured and analyzed only a few traits such as cybersecurity
awareness, self-efficacy, and risk-taking tendencies. In future research, other personality
traits such as the big five factors of personality could also be studied.
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8. CONCLUSIONS

This research examines the impact of positively and negatively framed security
risk information and base size on computer security risk perceptions of users. It also
investigates the relationship between risk perceptions and download intentions, as well as
download intentions and download decisions. In addition, it examines the effects of
various demographic factors and personality traits on perceived risks, e.g., gender, age,
cybersecurity awareness, internet structural assurance, and risk-taking tendencies.
Our findings are significant because negative framing is indeed the way computer
security risks should be presented to decision makers. Drawing on Prospect Theory, this
study focuses on understanding whether negatively framed cybersecurity risk information
could lead users to engage in less risk-taking or more conservative online behavior as
compared to positively framed cybersecurity risk information. The findings suggest that
the framing of risk information has a significant effect on users’ behavior. More
specifically, negative framing increases users’ perceived risk, leading to risk-averse
behavior, which is consistent with Prospect Theory in that people weigh losses greater
than gains of the same amount or magnitude.
The experimental conditions of our study are different other studies on framing
effect and decision-making in information science context (Beebe et al., 2014, Rosoff et
al., 2013, and Valecha et al., 2016). Our study presented one situation with two different
frames, i.e., negatively framed scenario vs. positively framed scenario, whereas their
studies provided two opposite scenarios, which are gain vs. loss or reward-based phishing
email vs. threat-based phishing email. Moreover, our results are different from the results
of Chen et al., (2015), which suggest that positive framing decreases risk-taking behavior.
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Their study provides two conditions: the amount of safety and the amount of risks of an
app installation. However, safety differs from risks because safety seems to be an
integrated concept and people rarely talk about the dimensions for safety, but risk is a
multi-dimension concept that generally is regarded to comprise three dimensions:
probability, assets, and consequences. Thus, people may tend to think of overall safety
but components of risks. The positive/negative framing in our study seems to be balanced
as we provided two conditions that are logically opposite to each other: among a group of
people, the number of people’s computers that were infected with viruses vs. the number
of people’s computers that were secure.
This study also explores the base size effect, which supports the idea that people
tend to be less risk seeking as base size increases, as discussed by Wang and Johnston
(1995), and Levin and Chapman (1990). In our study, the base size effect was found in
both positive and negative framing. The results demonstrate that base size affects
people’s risk perceptions such that the greater the base size, the higher the perceived risk.
Data analysis was also carried out to study the effect of personality traits, such as
cybersecurity awareness, general risk-taking tendencies, and Internet structural on users’
perceived computer security risk. We found a significant effect of users’ perceived
Internet structural assurance on perceived risk. Users who have higher internet structural
assurance are more likely to perceive less risk of downloading software from uncertified
sources. Moreover, there is a negative effect of general risk-taking tendencies on
perceived risk. Users with higher general risk-taking tendencies perceive less risks of
downloading software from uncertified sources.
In summary, this study offers insights on the impact of framing and base size in
the context of computer security. With the knowledge gained from this research, we hope

59
to design better warning systems to mitigate the risks undertaken by users. The findings
from this research study can also be applied to train employees about avoiding dangerous
software downloads by presenting training materials more effectively and thereby
reducing the chances of employees taking risky computer security actions.

APPENDIX A.
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1. POSITIVELY FRAMED SCENARIO
1.1 Small Base Size

1.2 Medium Base Size
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1.3 Large Base Size

2. NEGATIVELY FRAMED SCENARIO
2.1 Small Base Size
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2.2 Medium Base Size

2.3 Large Base Size
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Perceived
Risk

Download
Intention

Download
Decision

General
Information
Security
Awareness

Self-Efficacy

Cybersecurity
Awareness

Internet
Structural
Assurance

Measurement Items
(PR1) Please indicate how risky you perceive the action of
downloading this software for free from the uncertified source.
(PR2) Please indicate the level of risk of downloading this software for
free from the uncertified source.
(PR3) Please rate the riskiness of downloading this software for free
from the uncertified source.
(DI1) I intend to download this software for free from the uncertified
source.
(DI2) I plan to download this software for free from the uncertified
source.
(DI3) It is likely that I will download this software for free from the
uncertified source.
What is your choice of downloading this software?
• Option 1: Download and pay for the expensive software from
the certified source with no security risks
• Option 2: Download the software for free from this uncertified
source with the security risks indicated above
(GISA1) Overall, I am aware of potential security threats and their
negative consequences.
(GISA2) I have sufficient knowledge about the effect of potential
security problems. (Revised from original)
(GISA3) I understand the concerns regarding the risks posed by
information security.
(SE1) I am confident that I can remove viruses from my computer.
(SE2) I am confident that I can prevent unauthorized intrusion into my
computer.
(SE3) I believe I can configure my computer to protect it from viruses.
(CA1) I follow news and developments about virus technology.
(CA2) I follow news and developments about anti-virus technology.
(Revised from original)
(CA3) I discuss Internet security issues with friends and people around
me.
(CA4) I read about the problems of malicious software intruding into
Internet users’ computers.
(CA5) I seek advice from various sources on anti-virus products.
(Revised from original)
(CA6) I am aware of spyware problems and consequences.
(ISA1) The Internet has enough safeguards to make me feel
comfortable using it for online transactions.
(ISA2) I feel assured that legal structures adequately protect me from
problems on the Internet. (Revised from original)
(ISA3) I feel assured that technological structures adequately protect
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me from problems on the Internet. (Revised from original)
(ISA4) I feel confident that technological advances on the Internet
make it safe for me to carry out online transactions.
(ISA5) In general, the Internet is a safe environment to carry out online
transactions.
(GRT1) Safety first. (Reverse coded)
(GRT2) I prefer to avoid risks. (Reverse coded)
General
Risk-Taking
Tendencies

(GRT3) I take risks regularly.
(GRT4) I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen. (Reverse
coded)
(GRT5) I enjoy taking risks. (Revised from original)
(GRT6) In general, I view myself as a ... (Risk avoider = 1 to Risk
Seeker = 7)
(CSRT1) I do not take risks with computer security. (Reverse coded)
(CSRT2) I generally avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded)

Computer
Security
Risk-Taking
Tendencies

Framing
Manipulation
Check

(CSRT3) I play it safe with computer security risks. (Reverse coded)
(CSRT4) I prefer to avoid computer security risks. (Reverse coded)
(CSRT5) I am not afraid of taking computer security risks.
(CSRT6) I am willing to take risks with computer security.
(CSRT7) With regard to computer security, I view myself as a ... (Risk
avoider = 1 to Risk Seeker = 7)
In the previous scenarios, what kind of information was provided?
(Please check ALL that apply)
• Option 1: Number of people's computers that were safe and
secure
• Option 2: Number of people's computers that were infected
with viruses and crashed unexpectedly

APPENDIX D.
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1.

What is your gender? (Male, Female, Other)

2.

How old are you? (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85 or older)

3.

Please specify your ethnicity. (White, Black or African American, American Indian
or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Other, and Prefer Not
to Disclose)

4.

What is your marital status? (Married, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, and Never
Married)

5.

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you
have received? (Less than high school degree, High school graduate (high school
diploma or equivalent including GED), Some college but no degree, Associate
degree in college (2-year), Bachelor's degree in college (4-year), Master's degree,
Doctoral degree, and Professional degree (JD, MD))

6.

With regard to your education, what is your major area of study? (Please Specify)

7.

Which of the following best describes your current employment status? (Employed
full time, Employed part time, Unemployed looking for work, Unemployed not
looking for work, Retired, and Student)

8.

Please indicate your occupation: (Management, professional, and related; Sales and
office; Farming, fishing, and forestry; Government; Retired; Unemployed and Other
(Please Specify))

9.

Which of the following best represents your annual personal income (before taxes)
in the previous year? (Less than $10,000, $10,000 to $29,999, $30,000 to $49,999,
$50,000 to $69,999, $70,000 to $89,999, $90,000 to $109,999, $110,000 to
$129,999, $130,000 to $149,999, $150,000 or more, and Prefer not to disclose)
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10. Which of the following best represents your annual household income (before taxes)
in the previous year? (Less than $10,000, $10,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $99,999,
$100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 or $199,999, $200,000 to 249,999, More than
$250,000, and Prefer not to disclose)
11. How much disposable income or allowance (i.e., the money you can spend as you
want and not the money you spend on taxes, food, shelter and other basic needs) do
you have per month? (Less than $100, $100 - $500, $501 - $1000, $1001 - $2000,
More than $2000)
12. Approximately how many hours do you spend online per week? (1-5, 6-10, 11-15,
16-20, 20+)
13. How frequently do you download software from unknown sources? (Never,
Sometimes, About half the time, Most of the time, and Always)
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